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The  paper highlights the increased dispersion in net external positions in recent years, 
particularly among industrial countries. It provides a simple accounting framework that 
disentangles the factors driving the accumulation of external assets and liabilities (such as 
trade imbalances, investment income flows, and capital gains) for major external creditors 
and debtors. It also examines the factors driving the foreign asset portfolio of international 
investors, with a special focus on the weight of U.S. liabilities in the rest of the world’s stock 
of external assets. Finally, it relates the empirical evidence to the current debate about the 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
It is a basic accounting identity in international economics that the sum of external balances 
(whether for stock or flow positions) must add to zero: for every debtor, there must be a 
creditor counter-party in the system.
1 Although much can be learned by examining the 
external positions of individual countries in isolation, this fundamental insight suggests that a 
comprehensive understanding of external imbalances can only be achieved by taking a global 




A global perspective is also warranted by a second consideration—the growing level of 
cross-border integration in financial markets.
3 An important consequence of financial 
globalization is that countries are exposed to asset price movements in other countries even if 
net balances are zero, with the degree of exposure an increasing function of the scale of gross 
cross-border asset trade. However, the structure of international balance sheets radically 
differs across countries along dimensions such as the mix of equity and debt, currency 
composition, maturity structures, and liquidity. This means that shifts in the relative prices of 
different assets have implications for the dynamics of external balances, since individual 
countries have variable exposures to specific assets and hence experience asymmetric 
“valuation effects” from fluctuations in the financial terms of trade. Moreover, imperfect 
integration in goods markets means that the macroeconomic implications of even common 
asset price movements may be asymmetric across countries, since real exchange rate 
movements drive a wedge between domestic and foreign real returns. 
 
Accordingly, our goal in this paper is to develop an empirical analysis of the dynamics of 
external positions that takes into account the global interdependencies generated by net 
imbalances and the asymmetries in external capital structures. We are able to make progress 
on this issue by exploiting a revised and extended database on the foreign assets and 
liabilities held by a large number of countries over 1970-2003 (see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
2005b for a description), with an update to 2004 for most G-7 countries. This database allows 
us to trace out the dynamics of external positions for major creditor and debtor nations and 
identify the relative contributions of trade balances and valuation effects in generating and 
correcting external imbalances.  
 
                                                 
1 It is well known that this adding-up condition is wildly violated in the data, mainly due to 
endemic under-reporting of foreign assets by many countries. 
2 The global nature of external imbalances is a mainstay of academic research in this field but 
not always fully recognized in the policy debate. Bernanke (2005) represents an influential 
recent exception. 
3 See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2003, 2005a) for our contributions in documenting and 





Moreover, our measures of the external stocks of assets and liabilities can be combined with 
balance of payments data on capital flows to explore the nature of global portfolio 
adjustment. For instance, we can address such questions as to the determinants of relative 
rates of return between the U.S. and other destinations and how international investors re-
allocate capital between the U.S. and other destinations in their foreign asset portfolios in 
response to shifts in relative rates of returns and their net exposure to the US.  
 
Last but not least, the stylized facts and evidence provided in the paper can be useful in 
assessing the relative merits of different views that have been put forward on the causes and 
consequences of widening global imbalances, which have emphasized factors such as 
productivity developments, shocks to portfolio preferences, bubbles in asset prices, shifts in 
fiscal policy, and increased desired saving in emerging markets.  
 
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section II, we provide a brief overview 
of trends in global imbalances over the last decade. Section III lays out an accounting 
framework that permits a decomposition of the dynamics of net external positions into the 
underlying contributions of trade balances, rate of return effects and other factors.  This 
section then provides a detailed and up-to-date empirical analysis of the dynamics of external 
positions for major creditor and debtor nations, with a particular focus on the factors 
influencing rate of return differentials across countries. Another contribution of this section is 
to provide a detailed narrative of the role of valuation effects in driving the net external 
positions of the U.S. and Japan over the longer span of 1980-2004.   
 
We take a first step in section IV in analyzing some features of the portfolio of cross-border 
assets held by foreign investors, with a particular emphasis on understanding fluctuations in 
the U.S. share in the foreign asset portfolio held by the rest of the world. This section also 
considers what recent portfolio trends can tell us about the likely future path of capital flows 
to the US. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks in section V. 
 
II.   TRENDS IN GLOBAL IMBALANCES, 1994-2004 
In this section we document the main trends in global imbalances during the last decade. 
Figure 1 shows the current account balances (scaled by world GDP) for major countries and 
regions for the period 1994-2004. The picture highlights the substantial deterioration in the 
U.S. current account balance starting around 1997. This deterioration is mirrored by an 
improvement in the current account balance of emerging Asia, oil-producing Middle-Eastern 
countries (especially in recent years) and, to a lesser extent, small industrial countries such as 
Switzerland and Scandinavian countries.
4 
                                                 
4 A closer look at the factors underlying current account developments in emerging Asia 
suggests an interesting dichotomy between China and other East Asian emerging markets. 
While in China both national saving and domestic investment rose sharply as a ratio of GDP 
throughout the period, in other emerging Asian economies investment rates fell sharply in the 







Figure 2 shows the dynamics of the net foreign asset position.
5 The deterioration in the U.S. 
net foreign asset position until 2002, in line with widening current account deficits, is 
remarkable, but so is the fact that during 2003 and 2004 U.S. net liabilities have actually 
declined when scaled by world GDP, despite the large current account deficits. We 
investigate this issue further in the next section. At the same time, Japan, some small 
industrial countries, emerging Asia, and Middle-Eastern countries have built up significant 
creditor positions.  
 
As shown in Figure 3, the cross-country dispersion of net external positions has also 
increased during the last decade, whether scaled by world GDP or domestic GDP. The 
increase is sharper for external positions scaled by world GDP, because of the increased 
liabilities of the United States. The point is reinforced if one examines the size of net 
holdings of the top 5 creditors and debtors: in 1994 the liabilities of the top debtors (United 
States, Australia, Canada, Brazil, and Mexico) were 3.5 percent of world GDP, while the 
assets of the top creditors (Japan, Switzerland, Germany, Taiwan province of China, and the 
United Arab Emirates) accounted for 5 percent of world GDP. By 2003, the top-five creditors 
(Japan, Switzerland, Hong Kong SAR, Taiwan province of China, and Singapore) had a net 
balance of 8.2 percent of world GDP and the top-five debtors (United States, Spain, 
Australia, Brazil, and Mexico) a net balance of minus 10.3 percent of world GDP.
6 
 
In previous work (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003, 2005b), we have documented the 
spectacular growth in gross international asset trade, especially since the mid-1990s. To 
relate the magnitude of net positions to the size of gross asset trade, we use the Grubel-Lloyd 







, where A are external assets and L external liabilities. It takes the value 1 if the net 
position is zero and only gross cross-border asset trade takes place and the value 0 if asset 
trade occurs solely to finance net positions.  
 
Figure 4 shows the unweighted-average GL index in our database, as well as the index for G-











. The unweighted index is clearly trending upwards 
since the late 1980s, indicating that the growth in gross asset trade has been more dramatic 
than the increased dispersion in net positions.  As for G-7 countries, they have primarily 
engaged in gross asset trade, with smaller net positions, as indicated by the absolute values of 
                                                 
5 The net foreign asset data are from the comprehensive database on international investment 
positions developed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005b). Investment position data for 2004 
are based on preliminary calculations by the authors. 
6 Even excluding the United States, the 5 other largest debtors accounted for 2.6 percent of 





the index close to unity. Since 1990, the index has first increased sharply with the growth in 
asset trade, peaking in 1999, and then declined as G-7 net imbalances have widened.  
 
The growth in cross-border asset trade suggests that rates of return on external portfolios may 
have increased in importance as a driver of external positions, in addition to trade balances. 
In particular, return differentials between external assets and liabilities—driven by factors 
such as differences in types of instruments, currency composition, and risk profiles—can 
potentially exert significant effects on the dynamics of net foreign assets. How important a 
role have these factors played in explaining the widening dispersion of external imbalances 
in recent years? We turn to this question in the next section.  
 
 
III.   THE DYNAMICS OF EXTERNAL POSITIONS 
To explore in more detail the stylized facts described in the previous section, we first provide 
a simple accounting framework that relates the dynamics of net foreign assets to the trade 
balance, output growth, rates of return, and real exchange rates. We then use the framework 
to decompose the factors underlying changes in net foreign asset positions for the largest 
external creditors and debtors in recent years. 
 
A.   An Accounting Framework 
The change in the net foreign asset position B can be written as follows: 
 
  1 tt t tt B B CA KG − − =++ Ε  (1) 
 
where  t B  is the net foreign asset position,  t CA  is the current account balance,  t KG  is the 
capital gain or loss on net foreign assets (equal to the change in stocks minus the underlying 
flows) and the term  t E  includes factors such as capital account transfers (the so-called capital 
account balance) and errors and omissions that drive a wedge between a country’s current 
account and net inflows of capital. In turn, the current account  t CA  equals the sum of the 
balance on goods, services, and current transfers  t BGST  and the investment income balance 
11
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A
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t i  are 
the nominal yields on these assets and liabilities.
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where  t g  is the growth rate of real GDP,  t π  is the inflation rate, and the term ε  includes the 
ratio of capital transfers and errors and omissions to GDP. The second term on the right-
hand-side of equation (2) captures the effect of nominal returns on external assets and 
liabilities on the dynamics of the external position. To see this more clearly, define  ()
AL
tt kg kg  
as the ratio of the capital gain on external assets (liabilities), measured in domestic currency, 
to the outstanding stock of external assets (liabilities) at the beginning of the period, so 
that 11
AL
tt tt t kg A kg L KG −− −= . Then the real rate of return on foreign assets, measured in 














, and an analogous definition will hold for 
the rate of return on foreign liabilities 
L
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This framework delivers several important insights. First, the gap between current production 
and current absorption (i.e. the trade balance) is only one factor in determining the aggregate 
evolution of the net foreign asset position: the “intrinsic dynamics” of net foreign assets 
depend on the difference between the rate of return and the growth rate, captured by the 
second term on the RHS of (3), which is familiar from the standard debt accumulation 
equation. Second, when rates of return on external assets and liabilities differ, as captured by 
the last term on the RHS of equation (3), the gross scale of the international balance sheet 
matters in addition to the net position.  
 
Several factors can account for differences in rates of return between external assets and 
liabilities.
9 In larger advanced economies, assets tend to be denominated in foreign currency 
and liabilities mostly in domestic currency. Consequently, an unexpected exchange rate 
depreciation (not reflected in ex-ante interest differentials) will increase the domestic-
currency rate of return on external assets and hence improve the net foreign asset position. In 
contrast, for emerging markets that are net debtors and whose external liabilities are 
primarily denominated in foreign currency, a real exchange rate depreciation raises the 
domestic-currency burden of foreign liabilities.
 10 More generally, differential changes in 
                                                 
8 The same equation can be written using real rates of return in dollars, rather than domestic 
currency, using the equivalence 
$ 1( 1 ) ( 1 ) tt t rr s + =+ + where  t s  is the rate of real domestic-
currency appreciation vis-à-vis the US dollar.  
9 See also the extended discussion in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005a). 
10 A trend towards a larger share of external liabilities denominated in domestic currency is at 
play in emerging markets as well, driven in particular by the increased importance of foreign 





asset prices (for example, in stock prices) across countries will tend to drive a wedge between 
returns on external assets and liabilities. We highlight the quantitative role of these factors in 
explaining the recent evolution of net external positions in the following section. 
 
B.   Recent Evolution: Selected Countries 
We can now make use of equations (2) and (3) to show the factors contributing to the 
evolution of net foreign asset positions for a number of key countries over the past decade. 
Table 1 uses the decomposition highlighted by equation (2) for large industrial 
countries/areas for the period 1994-2000, and Table 2 for the period 2001-2004.  
 
During 1994-2000, the U.S. dollar strengthened and stock prices increased sharply in most 
markets. The current account deficit in the United States started to widen in 1998, but other 
industrial countries saw no large change in current account balances, with Switzerland 
continuing to post large current account surpluses and Australia large current account 
deficits. As was already discussed in the previous section, external imbalances were reduced 
or reversed in some emerging markets, particularly so in Asia after the 1997 crisis, and from 
the following year in Latin America. 
 
As shown in Table 1, valuation effects implied some losses for the United States and the 
United Kingdom during 1994-2000, on account of their strengthening currencies and 
booming stock markets during this period. Canada experienced large capital gains, in part 
due to its positive net equity position, which benefited from rapidly rising stock prices.  
 
As for the period 2001-2004, a number of interesting factors emerge from Table 2: 
 
•  Despite running substantial trade deficits (close to 5 percent of GDP per year on 
average), the cumulative increase in the external liabilities of the United States has 
been only about 1.5 percentage points per year. While growth helped, the lion’s share 
of the difference between the cumulative trade deficits and the deterioration in the net 
external position is accounted for by large capital gains (over 10 percent of GDP). In 
addition, despite being a net debtor throughout the period, the United States’ net 
investment income receipts have been positive.  
 
•  The picture for Canada and the euro area is in many ways the mirror image of the one 
for the United States. Despite running trade surpluses during this period, both have 
seen a deterioration in their external accounts, primarily in light of substantial capital 
losses.  
 
Tables 1 and 2 highlight the importance of capital gains and losses in driving the dynamics of 
net foreign asset positions. Accordingly, we probe more deeply the overall impact of rates of 
return on the dynamics of external positions in Table 3 and 4. The overall effect of returns is 
easily calculated by combining the capital gains with investment income (columns (4) and 
(7) in Tables 1 and 2). The Tables also shows the real rate of return (expressed in domestic 





explain rate of return differentials—namely, the percentage change in the real effective 
exchange rate and the differential between stock market price gains overseas and in the 
domestic economy (both measured in U.S. dollars).  
 
To fix thoughts, consider the following numerical example. Take a country that has net 
external liabilities of 20 percent of GDP at the beginning of the sample period, and assume 
that the rate of return on external assets and liabilities is the same, and is equal to 6 percent in 
nominal terms for the whole 4-year period. In this case, returns would explain a cumulative 
deterioration in the net external position of around 5 percent (1.2 percent per year). 
 
During the period 1994-2000 (Table 3), all large economies made strong returns on their 
external portfolios, thanks in particular to booming stock prices. It is interesting to notice that 
while the United States made some capital losses, in light of the large dollar appreciation and 
buoyant domestic stock market, it still earned higher returns on its assets than on its 
liabilities, thanks in particular to the larger weight of equity instruments in its asset portfolio 
than in its stock of foreign liabilities. 
 
Among countries that benefited from valuation effects during this period, Australia and 
Canada stand out. These countries enjoyed a hefty positive difference between the return on 
assets and on liabilities: Australia was helped by the depreciation of its currency, and 
Canada, as mentioned above, by its positive net equity position.  
 
As already highlighted in Table 2, the U.S. has made substantial capital gains on its net 
foreign asset position in the period 2001-2004. During these years, as shown in the second 
column of Table 4, the real effective exchange rate of the dollar has depreciated by 15 
percent, and “foreign” stock market prices have increased more rapidly than domestic prices 
(third column). As a result, rates of return on foreign assets (which are to a considerable 
extent denominated in foreign currency) have exceeded the rate of return on external 
liabilities by an average of over 5 percentage points.  
 
Results for Canada and the euro area are the opposite to the U.S. case (with the United 
Kingdom representing an intermediate case). Both have made capital losses on their external 
position, both experienced a real appreciation, and both paid out higher returns on their 
external liabilities than the returns they gained on their external assets.  
  
C.   Return differentials and capital gains: some historical evidence 
While differences in rates of return on external assets and liabilities are not new, two factors 
at play in recent years have contributed to make them both more important and more volatile. 
First, as documented in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003, 2005a), the size of gross external 
portfolios has grown dramatically, particularly during the past decade. As a result, a given 
rate of return differential between assets and liabilities has now a much larger effect on the 
dynamics of the net position, as clearly shown by equation (3). Second, the relative 
importance of direct investment and portfolio equity investment in international portfolios 





debt instruments. We document these stylized facts making use of a longer time series for the 




For the United States, capital gains and losses on external assets and liabilities are driven by 
stock price fluctuations and currency fluctuations. Since most of the foreign-currency-
denominated assets held by U.S. residents are in the form of equity (direct investment and 
portfolio equity instruments), capital gains and losses are primarily determined by the 
difference in foreign and domestic stock market performance, measured in U.S. dollars.   
 
Figure 5 plots the evolution of capital gains and losses (defined as the difference between the 
net external position and cumulative capital flows) together with the real effective exchange 
rate of the dollar, for the period 1980-2004. While in certain periods the correlation between 
capital gains and the real exchange rate is clearly very strong, the data suggest a more 
nuanced view.   
 
•  During the period 1983-1989, the co-movement between the real exchange rate and 
capital gains was very strong. In particular, the United States made substantial capital 
gains on its external position between end-1984 and end-1988 (around 7 percent of 
GDP), thanks to two factors. First, the impact of the sharp real effective depreciation 
(over 30 percent) on the dollar value of foreign assets, particularly foreign direct 
investment. And second, the strong increase in foreign stock prices, above and 
beyond what can be explained by the dollar depreciation.
12 
 
•  During 1988-1992, the U.S. made capital losses on its external position of around 3 
percent of GDP.
13 This time the real exchange rate was broadly flat. However, stock 
market performance diverged strongly: U.S. markets increased sharply, while foreign 
markets—particularly Japan—declined. Therefore, capital gains were driven by asset 
prices, rather than exchange rates. 
 
•  During 1992-1994, the exchange rate was again broadly flat, while there was a major 
net capital gain (7.5 percent of GDP), arising from the strong performance of non-
U.S. stock markets (up almost 40 percent) relative to the U.S. stock market (up 6 
percent).  
                                                 
11 See Tille (2003) for an interesting study of valuation effects during the period 1990-2002. 
12 It is striking that these gains accrued with equity holdings abroad totaling only 8 percent of 
GDP at end-1984. At end-2004, equity holdings abroad amounted to 50 percent of GDP.  
13 Losses may actually be understated in the data, because likely underestimation of portfolio 
equity outflows suggests very large capital gains on U.S. foreign equity holdings, despite 






•  During the period 1994-2001, the real appreciation of the U.S. dollar and the stronger 
performance of U.S. stock markets relative to overseas markets implied capital losses 
on external asset holdings totaling 5 percent of GDP.  
 
•  Finally, during 2002-2004 the weakening dollar and stronger stock market 
performance overseas with respect to the United States generated capital gains for the 
U.S. amounting to over 12 percent of GDP.  
 
In sum, over the period the United States has enjoyed nontrivial capital gains on its external 
asset holdings, albeit with considerable fluctuations from period to period. This effect is in 
addition to the well-documented positive differential between the yield on U.S. assets and the 
one on U.S. liabilities, and has implied that the U.S. has enjoyed a large positive rate of 




For Japan, capital gains and losses on their external equity portfolio depend on asset prices in 
equity markets, while gains and losses on the debt portfolio depend particularly on exchange 
rate fluctuations, as the currency composition of domestic liabilities is more skewed towards 
yen denomination than the currency composition of their debt assets.  
 
During the second half of the 1980s Japan’s real appreciation and run-up in stock prices 
implied capital losses on their net external position (Figure 6), while during the mid-1990s 
Japan did not experience sizable net capital gains or losses on its external position. A sizable 
“cycle” in capital gains and losses started in 1999, with significant losses driven by the equity 
portfolio—liabilities increased in value substantially, with booming domestic stock prices. 
These losses were reversed since, driven by gains on the equity portfolio during 2000-2001 
(as Japanese stock price plummeted faster than world stock prices), and by gains on debt 
instruments following the yen depreciation over the next 3 years.  
 
Rates of return for major countries 
 
Table 5 puts together capital gains and investment income data, showing the rates of return 
on external assets and liabilities, broken down by international financial instrument, for the 
last 10 years. Care should be exercised in comparing returns across countries, particularly so 
since some countries (like the United States) measure foreign direct investment at market 
value, while others (like the euro area) measure investment at book value.
14 Nevertheless, 
Table 5 contains some useful and interesting stylized facts.  
                                                 
14 Ceteris paribus, returns measured at market value will be higher than returns at book value 
during stock market booms (for example, the periods 1994-1999 and 2003-2004) and lower 
during periods of stock market declines (such as 2000-2001). Another potential problem in 
measuring returns on foreign direct investment is the distortion created by tax-driven transfer 






•  The share of equity instruments in total external assets and liabilities differs sharply 
across major financial centers; for example, the 2004 share of equity assets in the 
U.S. external portfolio is close to 60 percent, compared to under 20 percent in Japan.  
 
•  During the last decade, the United States earned a higher rate of return on its assets 
than on its liabilities, except for the period 2000-2001.
15 In general, the favorable  
return differential is associated with the ‘equity premium’, together with the higher 
weight of equities in total assets than in total liabilities.  
 
•  Japan has instead earned lower returns on its assets than on its liabilities, with the 
exception of the period 2000-2001.  
 
•  Rates of return on assets and liabilities for the United Kingdom have been lower than 
for the United States, primarily on account of the lower share of equities in the United 
Kingdom‘s external portfolio.  
  
 
D.   Summary and Discussion 
The evidence in this section has highlighted that the distribution of net external positions has 
widened in recent years. Moreover, with financial globalization, the dynamics of positions 
has become heavily influenced by factors other than accumulated current account balances. 
A striking illustration is provided by the contrasting fortunes of the U.S. and Canada during 
2001-2004: both countries experienced virtually identical declines in their net foreign asset 
positions (5.8 percent and 5.7 percent respectively), even though the U.S. ran a cumulative 
trade deficit of 19.8 percent of GDP, while Canada ran a cumulative trade surplus of 18.5 
percent of GDP during this period. 
 
The wealth effects associated with capital gains and losses on international positions are 
imperfectly understood (Obstfeld 2004). Clearly, sharp distinctions must be drawn between 
valuation shocks that benefit both home and foreign investors (such as an improvement in 
domestic asset returns) versus those that inevitably generate asymmetries (such as the 
valuation effects induced by shifts in exchange rates): external valuation effects should not 
be viewed in isolation from aggregate (domestic and foreign) wealth dynamics.
16 Indeed, 
valuation effects at times simply reflect risk sharing: if a country’s economic prospects 
                                                 
15 The same result holds for the previous decade. The U.S. made earned higher returns on 
assets in 1980-84 (3 percentage points), 1985-89 (7 percentage points), and 1990-94 (4 
percentage points). 
16 Ideally, it would be desirable to express external positions relative to measures of wealth 
rather than GDP. However, good measures of domestic wealth are not widely available and 





improve, the value of capital will go up, and part of the benefit accrues to foreign owners of 
domestic capital.   
 
Some recent contributions have attempted to incorporate international valuation effects into 
analyses of external adjustment (Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sa 2005, Cline 2005, Corsets and 
Konstantinou 2005, Edwards 2005, Gourinchas and Rey 2005, International Monetary Fund 
2005, Obstfeld and Rogoff 2005, and Roubini and Setser 2005) and quantitative models of 
monetary policy (Benigno 2001 and Tille 2005). It is widely recognized in this literature that 
the portfolio behavior of international investors is a critical element in understanding the 
macroeconomic impact of valuation shocks.
17 Accordingly, in the next section, we conduct a 
preliminary investigation of the dynamics of international portfolios, with a special focus on 
the distribution of foreign asset holdings between the U.S. and other destinations. 
 
 
IV.    GLOBAL PORTFOLIO DYNAMICS 
In the previous section, a recurrent theme has been that the growth in cross-border 
investment positions has increased the importance of valuation effects in determining the 
evolution of net foreign assets. There has also been some speculation that financial 
globalization has also increased the sustainability of external imbalances, in line with an 
increased capacity of the global investor pool to absorb the liabilities issued by individual 
countries (Greenspan 2005).  
 
In this section, we probe this claim by investigating the relations among rate of return 
differentials, portfolio holdings, capital flows and net foreign asset positions. In particular, 
we focus on the dynamics of the U.S. share in the aggregate cross-border financial holdings 
of foreign investors. Finally, we discuss whether there are indications that the capacity of the 
rest of the world to absorb U.S. liabilities is diminishing. 
 
A.   Recent Trends  
Figure 7 shows the importance of U.S. external liabilities in total and in various asset 
categories relative to the rest of the world’s holdings of foreign assets.  
 
In terms of total holdings, the early 1980s represents an earlier phase of rapid growth in  U.S. 
prominence in the foreign portfolios of the rest of the world, growing from 19.3 percent in 
1980 to 28.3 percent in 1985. There was a subsequent reversal during 1986-1990, with the 
1985 peak only being surpassed in 1996. The late 1990s saw a rapid increase in the U.S. 
share, peaking at 34.9 percent in 1999. Recent years have seen a substantial decline: the share 
of the U.S. in the total foreign assets held by the rest of the world had decreased to 26.2 
percent in 2003. The decline has been even more spectacular for the equity category: the U.S. 
                                                 
17 These authors generally build on the earlier portfolio-balance literature developed by 





share has fallen from 51.2 percent in 1998 to 29.7 percent in 2003. The smallest decline has 
been in the debt category, falling from a 2001 peak of 27.8 percent to 24.1 percent in 2003.
 18  
 
Of course, the recent decline in part has to do with the decline in the value of U.S. assets in 
recent years, between the asset price reversal in U.S. equity markets and the depreciation of 
the dollar since 2001. It also reflects an acceleration in the scale of cross-border asset trade 
among other country pairs in recent years (for instance, growing cross-border trade within 
Europe and within the emerging market grouping), such that the U.S. matters less than it 
previously did as a financial trading partner. 
 
Figure 8 provides a complementary perspective by showing the evolution of the net external 
position of the U.S. (scaled by U.S. GDP): in recent years, the trend increase in net portfolio 
debt has accelerated, while its traditional net positive position in equity has re-emerged, after 
the temporary decline in this category in the late 1990s (in fact, the net equity position was 
only negative in one year – 2001).  
 
 
B.   An Analysis of Portfolio Dynamics 
Next, we examine the underlying factors driving the evolution of the share of U.S. assets in 















t FA is the total value of cross-border assets held by non-U.S. investors and 
, ROW US
t FA is the value of the U.S. assets held by non-U.S. investors.
19 This ratio will fluctuate 
                                                 
18 The International Monetary Fund’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey provides an 
alternative source of information on the US share in international portfolios. Excluding 
offshore centers, the 2003 US share in the total portfolio holdings of the rest of the world 
amounted to 21.7 percent. For individual asset categories, the shares for portfolio equity, 
long-term debt securities and short-term debt securities were 18.4 percent, 22.4 percent and 
32.7 percent respectively. 
19An increase in foreign holdings of US assets can be attributed to some combination of an 
increase in the share of foreign assets that is allocated to the US; an increase in the ratio of 
foreign to total assets of the rest of the world; and an increase in the ratio of total assets to 
GDP for the rest of the world. Here, we focus on the first component: the share of total cross-
border assets that is allocated to the US. As such, we do not here investigate the growth in the 
aggregate foreign assets held by the rest of the world and its relation to the financial 






over time in line with shifts in the allocation of capital flows between the U.S. and other 













= ⎢ ⎥ ++ ⎣ ⎦
 (5) 
 
where rates of return  ,
US SUM
tt RR are expressed in dollar terms and flows are expressed as a 
percentage of the accumulated positions  1 / tt t FL FLOW FA− = .  
 
Given this partitioning, it is useful to analyze the behavior of relative rates of return and 
relative capital flows. With respect to the former, we begin by highlighting the key role 
played by the exchange rate in determining rate of return differentials between the U.S. and 
the rest of the world. Table 6 reports simple regressions of various relative return indicators 
on the U.S. multilateral real exchange rate. Using investment position and balance of 
payments data, we derive rates of return for the U.S. as in the previous section: namely, the 
rate of return in a given category is the sum of investment income plus capital gains, divided 
by the accumulated asset position. For rates of return in the rest of the world, we use market-
based indicators, based on ex-US global return indices for stocks and bonds.
20 As a 
robustness check, we also examine return indices for U.S. stocks and bonds in addition to the 
BOP-derived returns. Finally, as a general proxy for economy-wide returns, we also consider 
the difference between U.S. and global GDP growth rates.  
 
The results are shown in Table 6. With the exceptions of BOP-derived debt returns and 
relative output growth, the simple regression of relative returns on the real exchange rate is 
significant in all categories: real appreciation of the dollar increases the return on U.S.-
located assets relative to overseas returns.
21  
 
Although Table 6 contains some useful information, it is desirable to seek the underlying 
fundamental determinants of changes in real exchange rates and other factors driving return 
differentials. In particular, we are interested in knowing whether the outstanding portfolio 
positions influences these return factors. According to the portfolio balance literature, we 
might expect a negatively-sloped demand schedule for U.S.-issued liabilities – the greater is 
                                                 
20 The bond and stock return data are from Global Financial Data. The stock return index is 
used as a proxy for returns on both portfolio equity and FDI; the bond return index is used a 
proxy for returns in the debt category. A weighted average of stock and bond returns is 
employed for the return on the aggregate holdings of foreign assets. 
21 Here we employ the trade-weighted real exchange rate. Results were quite similar for a 
crude portfolio-weighted real exchange rate. That the exchange rate is significant for relative 
bond returns in row (6) but not relative debt returns in row (2) is consistent with poor 





the share of U.S. assets in the accumulated portfolio, the larger is the risk premium required 
to hold these assets. On the other side, as has been highlighted by Gourinchas and Rey 
(2005), the stability of the U.S. net external position is facilitated by a negative relation 
between outstanding liabilities and returns.  
 
Accordingly, Table 7 regresses these return factors on the lagged level of the U.S. net foreign 
asset position, the lagged share of U.S. assets in the aggregate cross-border portfolio of 
foreign investors, and the lagged share of capital flows to the U.S. to aggregate cross-border 
flows. In order to isolate the exchange rate channel, we first examine the impact of portfolio 
factors on exchange rate behavior; in subsequent regressions for the other return factors, the 
exchange rate term is held fixed such that these regressions pick up any influence of portfolio 
factors on other components of these return factors.  Accordingly, for these return categories, 
the specification is 
 
11 2 1 3 1 () _ _
US ROW US US US US
tt t t t t t R R DREER NFAY ST SHARE FL SHARE α ρβ β β ε −− − −= + + + + +  (6) 
 
where 
US DREER is the rate of real exchange rate appreciation by the U.S. against its trading 
partners, 
US NFAY  is the ratio of U.S. net foreign assets to GDP,  _
US ST SHARE is the share 
of the U.S. in the rest of the world’s total cross-border holdings in that category, 
and _
US FL SHARE  is the share of capital flows to the U.S. in the rest of the world’s total 
cross-border capital flows in that category. 
 
A number of striking results emerge from Table 7. First, the exchange rate tends to 
appreciate, the more positive is the lagged net foreign asset position and the smaller is the 
lagged share of the U.S. in portfolio flows. This pattern is qualitatively consistent with the 
Gourinchas-Rey finding: strong capital inflows and a high outstanding net liability position is 
associated with subsequent real depreciation.
22 Second, the strong influence of exchange 
rates on return differentials found in Table 6 is confirmed in the broader specifications in 
columns (2)-(6) of Table 7. Third, the exchange rate channel is not the only route by which 
the outstanding net foreign asset position influences debt and equity return differentials – 
again, the pattern is stabilizing, with relative returns on U.S. assets declining (holding fixed 
the exchange rate) as the net foreign asset position deteriorates.  
 
Moreover, as shown in columns (3) and (5), an increase in the share of the U.S. in lagged 
equity positions and lagged equity flows is associated with a decline in subsequent relative 
                                                 
22 The Gourinchas-Rey setup involves identifying unsustainable external positions by 
examining the co-movement of net exports and the net foreign asset position. Our 
specification rather takes a ‘financial account’ perspective by looking at capital flows rather 






returns, reinforcing the stabilization pattern. The only evidence in favor of the portfolio-
balance argument is that relative bond returns are increasing in the relative size of the U.S. in 
bond portfolios – but these results are not quite significant and hold constant the exchange 
rate channel. Finally, it is intriguing to note that an increase in the share of the U.S. in the 
foreign asset portfolio of foreign investors is associated with an increase in relative output 
growth in the U.S. (although again this result is only marginally significant). 
 
In summary, the results in Table 7 do not provide much evidence that investors have 
demanded a risk premium in relative returns in order to absorb increased levels of U.S. 
liabilities in their portfolios. Rather, there is considerable support for a stabilizing pattern in 
returns, with returns negatively covarying with portfolio exposures. Of course, these results 
may well be specific to this sample period and may not carry over in projecting future returns 
to the extent that investor attitudes to U.S. liabilities may well shift (or have already shifted). 
 
Our next step is to explore the influence of portfolio factors on relative capital flows. Again, 
we adopt a portfolio-balance perspective and ask how relative capital flows adjust to lagged 
returns and the scale of the portfolio exposure to the U.S. We look at both absolute capital 
flows to the U.S., 
US
t FL (expressed as a percentage of lagged U.S. liabilities) and capital flows 
to the U.S. relative to capital flows from the rest of the world to other destinations 
(
US ROW
tt FL FL − ). We allow for persistence in flows by including the lagged dependent 
variable as a regressor.  
 
In addition, we include the lagged three-year moving average of relative returns in the U.S. 
versus the rest of the world  11
US ROW
tt RR −− − . To the extent that future relative returns are 
unpredictable, an investor that wishes to maintain a fixed U.S. weight in her international 
portfolio must offset poor relative returns in one period with a subsequent increase in relative 
flows. However, lagged returns may also serve as a leading indicator for future returns (with 




In order to further capture elements of the portfolio-balance story, we also include the 
outstanding portfolio position (for absolute capital flows to the U.S., we include the lagged 
stock of U.S. liabilities relative to U.S. GDP,  1
US
t L −  ; for the relative flows specification, we 
include the lagged share of U.S. liabilities in the total foreign asset portfolio of international 
investors,  1 _
US
t ST SHARE − ). To the extent that investors wish to maintain stable portfolio 
                                                 
23Hau and Rey (2004) provide empirical support for the portfolio-balance model, using 
monthly data on equity flows, equity returns, and exchange rates. Also using monthly data, 
Bohn and Tesar (1996) find evidence of return-chasing in the foreign equity purchases of US 
investors. However, Portes and Rey (2005) do not find evidence of return-chasing in annual 





shares, we should generally expect that an increase in the portfolio share in one period is 
associated with a subsequent contraction in relative capital flows. 
 
More formally, the specifications for absolute and relative capital flows are  
 
  
() () ( )
11 12 1
11 1 1 12 1 _
US US US US
tt t t t
US ROW US ROW US ROW US
tt tt t t t t
FL FL R L
FL FL FL FL R R ST SHARE
αρ β β ε
α ρβ βε
−−−
−− − − −
=+ + + +
−= +−+− + +
 (7) 
 
The results are presented in Table 8. These regressions deliver some striking results. First, 
the dynamic behavior of capital flows differs substantially across asset categories. While 
there is significant positive serial correlation for aggregate flows and FDI flows, the pattern 
is actually negative for equity flows: all else equal, high equity flows in one period are 
reversed in the next period.  
 
Second, there is some evidence that lagged returns influence the level of capital flows. For 
absolute and relative debt flows, an improvement in U.S. relative returns is associated with a 
subsequent decline in the relative share of the U.S. in debt flows. In contrast, there is some 
evidence that capital flows are positively influenced by lagged returns for the equity and FDI 
categories. (However, this is only true for absolute capital flows. Lagged relative returns do 
not explain the relative share of flows to the U.S. in these categories. It seems as if high 
relative returns in the U.S. are associated with a generalized increase in capital flows in the 
equity and FDI categories to the U.S. but also to other destinations.) 
 
Holding fixed return differentials, the evidence on the relation between outstanding portfolio 
positions and subsequent capital flows is mixed. For absolute and relative capital flows in the 
FDI category, the results do indicate that a high outstanding U.S. share is associated with a 
subsequent decline in FDI flows to the US. This is also true for relative flows in the portfolio 
equity category, even if absolute portfolio equity flows positively co-move with the 
outstanding level of  U.S. portfolio equity liabilities. The outstanding debt position does not 
influence absolute or relative debt flows to the U.S. In part, this may reflect the role played 
by central banks in debt flows and the complexity of policy decisions regarding reserve 
accumulation. 
 
In summary, the results from the non-structural regressions in Table 8 provide some insights 
into the dynamics of capital flows. The variation in behavior across asset categories is 
especially striking, with the correlates of capital flows markedly different between debt, 
portfolio equity and FDI categories. However, our findings are certainly not conclusive 
regarding the importance of portfolio-balance factors: more detailed investor-level data, plus 
a structural econometric approach, would be required for a more accurate investigation. 
 
C.   Looking to the Future 
We conclude this section by examining whether there any indications that the capacity of 






There are several forces pointing towards a declining appetite for U.S.-issued liabilities. First, 
as is shown in Figures 9, 10, and 11, the composition of capital flows to the U.S. has shifted 
in recent years: equity (portfolio and FDI) inflows have dried up, with a much greater 
reliance on debt inflows than in the late 1990s. This is consistent with the evidence in the 
previous section to the extent that the decline in equity inflows may be attributed to the lower 
returns earned by foreign equity investors in the U.S. relative to other major financial centers. 
An increased dependence on debt flows increases the risk profile of U.S. external liabilities 
and also leaves the U.S. more vulnerable to sudden shifts in investor sentiment. 
 
Second, within the category of debt flows, there has been a broadly-recognized shift from 
private to official foreign investors, with foreign central banks emerging as the key marginal 
purchaser of U.S. debt issues (especially U.S. government debt). We illustrate this in Figure 
12: the ratio of official to total debt inflows average 8.8 percent during 1999-2001 and rose to 
26.3 percent during 2002-2004 (official flows relative to portfolio debt inflows averaged 17.3 
percent during 1999-2001 and 42.6 percent during 2002-2004).
24  
 
Third, there are strong reasons to believe that the recent rapid pace of reserve accumulation 
that has been a mainstay of demand for U.S.-issued liabilities will not be sustained. For 
instance, Figure 13 shows that reserves are at a historic high for the group of developing 
countries and studies such as IMF (2003) have shown that the recent level of reserves far 
exceeds that predicted by standard models of optimal reserve holdings. The current policy 
debate in these countries all point to a reduction in their level of demand for U.S. debt 
securities via greater currency diversification in reserves, modifications of exchange rate 
strategies, and an improving climate for domestic investment after several years of post-crisis 
retrenchment, reform and restructuring.
25  
 
More generally, the evidence in this paper is that an important reason why the share of U.S. 
liabilities in the portfolios of foreign investors has been maintained at a relatively stable level 
(relative to the scale of capital flows to the U.S.) has been the operation of the valuation 
channel of exchange rate adjustment: increases in portfolio shares have been undone through 
exchange rate depreciation. As is extensively discussed in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005a), 
it is not a viable long-run strategy to rely on such valuation gains to ameliorate a structural 
reliance on net capital inflows. At some point, the vision of the U.S. as a safe haven and 
natural home for liquid holdings would be undercut by persistent portfolio losses induced by 
                                                 
24 These numbers are lower bounds for the importance of the official sector, since significant 
official flows take place through indirect transactions. See also Higgins and Klitgaard (2004). 
Roubini and Setser (2005) make the important additional observation that the maturity 
structure of U.S. (government) liabilities has shortened considerably in recent years.  
25 It is also understood that Japan has decelerated its official purchases of U.S. assets, ceasing 





a depreciating currency and/or investors will begin to require more significant risk premia on 
U.S.-issued liabilities. 
 
Finally, a countervailing factor is that the growth in cross-border asset trade has amplified the 
importance of rate of return differentials. To the extent that the U.S. does manage to maintain 
a positive return differential (either due to composition effects or superior performance 
within given asset categories), the ongoing scaling-up of its international balance sheet 
progressively increases the gain from this financial transformation process. A simple 
numerical example helps clarify this point, using U.S. data and equation (3) as a guide. 
Assume that the net foreign asset position b equals minus 25 percent of GDP, the output 
growth rate g is 3 percent, the real rate of return on external liabilities 
L r  is 4 percent (its 
average level in the U.S. for the past 20 years), and gross foreign assets stand at 80 percent of 
GDP (roughly their end-2004 level for the U.S.). In this case, with no return differential 
between external assets and liabilities, a trade deficit of 5 percent of GDP would entail a 
deterioration of net foreign assets of 5¼ percent of GDP. However, with a positive 
differential of 300 basis points between returns on assets and on liabilities (its average level 
for the period 1990-2004), the net foreign asset position would deteriorate by only 3 percent 
of GDP—a gain of over 2 percent of GDP with respect to the benchmark case.
26 If gross 
assets were, say, 110 percent of GDP, the deterioration in net foreign assets would only be 2 
percent of GDP—a gain of over 3 percent of GDP. Even a 125 basis point differential at the 
current level of financial globalization delivers a non-trivial gain of 1 percent of GDP. 
 
Clearly these calculations are purely illustrative, and rely on the assumption that the rate of 
return differential stay constant as the level of international financial integration increases—
the pay-off to an increase in the gross foreign asset position would obviously be smaller, if 
growth in cross-border holdings were concentrated in those asset categories in which the U.S. 
return premium is less significant. 
 
V.   CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has provided wide-ranging empirical evidence on the dynamics of external 
positions for key creditor and debtor nations. We have highlighted the key role of valuation 
effects in the recent evolution of external imbalances, which have moved in a stabilizing 
direction for the world’s largest debtor, while other countries have experienced the 
depressing combination of substantial trade surpluses yet sharp declines in their net external 
positions. We have also presented some preliminary findings concerning the inter-relations 
between relative rates of return, portfolio shares and international capital flows. 
 
                                                 
26 To put it differently, a 300 basis points return differential means that a trade deficit of 2 
percent of GDP would be consistent with a stable net foreign asset position, despite the 





An important message from our work is that the notion that the United States attracts foreign 
capital because it offers high returns to foreign investors appears, for the years of the new 
millennium, rather shaky. Our analysis of relative rates of return and capital flows shows 
that: (i) U.S. residents have consistently earned higher returns on their assets than they pay 
out on their liabilities; (ii) real dollar returns on foreign investment in the United States have 
on average been negative over the past 4 years, and even more so when expressed in the 
currencies of most foreign investor countries; and (iii) since 2000, capital flows to the United 
States have shifted towards fixed-rate (and low-yield) debt instruments, and away from 
equities, even during the recovery in stock market performance in 2003-2004. In addition, the 
recent accumulation of dollar assets by the foreign official sector is unlikely to persist into 
the indefinite future—a tightening at the margin of external demand for U.S.-issued liabilities 
is clearly possible, although the timing of this shift is of course highly uncertain.  
 
Finally, the United States has relied on sizable capital gains to stabilize its external position 
during the past few years. Looking forward, exploiting this channel again would require a 
continued sizable differential in rates of return between U.S. external assets and liabilities. 
While some positive differential may well persist, and would play an increasingly important 
role as long as financial integration increases, logic would suggest that return differentials of 
the order of magnitude of those seen in the past 3 years cannot be sustained for a prolonged 
period of time—they would likely require persistent dollar depreciation, which would 
eventually be incorporated in inflation expectations and ex-ante interest rate differentials. 
Notwithstanding the importance of valuation effects, the current level of U.S. trade deficits 
cannot be permanently sustained and global adjustment requires the rebalancing of savings 
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United States -3.3 -13.5 -15.9 1.4 0.6 2.7 -2.4
United Kingdom 2.0 -5.7 -10.8 2.8 2.1 2.4 -2.3
France -4.2 15.1 11.0 0.5 2.6 -0.6 1.5
Germany 9.5 -8.1 -4.4 -0.7 0.8 -0.7 -3.1
Italy -9.4 11.8 16.8 -6.7 -6.2 1.3 6.5
Canada -33.6 28.8 20.6 -20.4 6.3 5.5 16.8
Japan 14.4 9.9 6.6 7.3 0.8 -0.5 -4.3
Switzerland 100.3 23.1 9.5 47.7 1.8 -15.3 -20.7
Australia -65.3 5.1 -7.0 -20.0 1.3 18.5 12.3
Table 1. Decomposition of change in net foreign assets, 1995-2000
Cumulative current account
Initial NFA position 
(1994)





Note: The decomposition reflects the one in equation (2) in the text, with all variables scaled by GDP. For example, the 
cumulative trade balance is equal to the sum of the trade balance to GDP ratio. The column KA, EO indicates the sum of errors 










income KA, EO Growth K-gains
United States -16.7 -5.8 -19.8 1.0 -0.9 3.9 10.1
United Kingdom -3.7 -9.1 -15.3 7.4 0.6 1.0 -2.9
Euro Area -9.8 -5.6 3.9 -2.3 0.4 1.4 -9.0
Canada -4.8 -5.7 18.5 -9.7 -1.0 1.7 -15.2
Japan 24.3 14.5 5.0 6.8 -1.2 0.3 3.7
Australia -52.2 -17.2 -7.5 -11.4 -1.5 14.6 -11.4
Table 2. Decomposition of change in net foreign assets, 2001-2004
Initial NFA 
(2000)
Change in net 
foreign assets




Note: The decomposition reflects the one in equation (2) in the text, with all variables scaled by GDP. For example, the 
cumulative trade balance is equal to the sum of the trade balance to GDP ratio. The column KA, EO indicates the sum of errors 








Rate of return 




avg real return 
on assets
avg real return 
on liabilities
United States -3.3 -0.9 26.4 -143.0 8.8 7.9
United Kingdom 2.0 0.5 25.6 10.9 4.7 4.7
France -4.2 2.1 -9.9 -54.5 11.0 11.0
Germany 9.5 -3.8 -12.6 -4.2 5.4 6.8
Italy -9.4 -0.2 2.0 -16.5 7.1 6.4
Canada -33.6 -3.6 -1.4 -41.9 8.0 6.0
Japan 14.4 3.0 -5.1 168.6 7.2 8.2
Switzerland 100.3 27.0 -4.6 -47.2 7.0 8.5
Australia -65.3 -7.7 -12.9 85.9 11.1 5.7




Note: The decomposition reflects the one in equation (3) in the text. The rate of return effects are given by the sum of investment 
income and capital gains in Table 2. The change in REER equals the percentage change in the country’s real effective exchange 
rate between end-1994 and end-2000. The stock price column indicates the difference between the percentage increase of foreign 
stock prices (in dollars) and domestic stock prices (also in dollars). Real rates of return on external assets and liabilities are 






United States -16.7 11.1 -14.8 11.6 4.8 -0.4
United Kingdom -3.7 4.6 1.6 -6.3 0.1 -0.4
Euro Area -9.8 -11.3 31.5 4.4 -2.7 -0.5
Canada -4.8 -24.9 16.0 -27.8 -5.3 0.5
Japan 24.3 10.5 -16.8 -0.6 5.9 5.0
Australia -52.2 -22.8 23.8 -81.1 1.7 3.3
avg real return 
on assets
Table 4. Decomposition of change in net foreign assets, 2001-2004: Rates of return
Rate of return 
effects












Note: The decomposition reflects the one in equation (3) in the text. The rate of return effects are given by the sum of investment 
income and capital gains in Table 2. The change in REER equals the percentage change in the country’s real effective exchange 
rate between end-2000 and end-2004. The stock price column indicates the difference between the percentage increase of foreign 
stock prices (in dollars) and domestic stock prices (also in dollars). Real rates of return on external assets and liabilities are 





Total Equity Debt Total Equity Debt
1995-1999 11.8 17.8 3.5 59 10.5 22.9 2.4 42
2000-2001 -7.9 -14.4 3.5 60 -4.9 -13.3 3.9 47
2002-2004 9.6 13.7 6.1 56 0.9 3.8 0.3 38
1995-1999 6.2 3.1 1.9 29 10.1 22.1 -0.4 20
2000-2001 13.7 6.8 10.2 40 0.7 -24.4 3.2 29
2002-2004 2.8 -1.7 1.3 33 5.8 8.7 -2.2 26
1995-1999 4.8 11.3 2.4 28 5.4 16.0 2.5 24
2000-2001 1.7 -1.6 3.5 33 0.4 -5.5 3.2 29
2002-2004 0.4 3.6 -0.9 30 -0.3 0.4 -0.3 23
1995-1999
2000-2001 0.7 -5.8 5.1 32 0.6 -5.8 4.9 45




Table 5. Real domestic-currency returns on external assets and liabilities




Asset returns Returns on liabilities Share of equity 
in total assets
 
Note: returns are constructed as the sum of investment income and capital gains, divided by 
the stock of outstanding assets or liabilities at the end of the previous year. Capital gains in 
year t are given by the difference between the change in the stock of assets and liabilities 
between end-year t and year t-1, minus the asset or liability flow during year t. They are 






Table 6. Rate of Return Differentials and the Real Exchange Rate 
 
  Return differential  D(REER)  Adj. R
2   Obs   DW 
        
(1) Aggregate  0.35 (3.84)***  0.18  24    2.18
(2) Debt    0.15  (1.35) 0.09   18    1.85
(3) Portfolio  equity  1.45 (2.95)***  0.24  18    1.94
(4) FDI    0.77  (2.8) ***  0.23   24    1.42
           
(5)  Stocks (US minus ROW)  1.46 (3.12)***  0.31  24    1.39
(6)  Bonds (US minus ROW)  0.71 (2.96)***  0.27  24    2.32
(7)  Growth differ. (US minus ROW) 0.02 (.49)  -0.04  24    1.57
 
 
Note:  The dependent variable is the differential between the rate of return on assets held by 
nonresidents in the U.S. and the rate of return in the rest of the world. The explanatory 
variable is the rate of appreciation of the U.S. real effective exchange rate. Estimation by 
OLS, with t-statistics calculated using Newey-West standard errors. See text for definitions 


























Table 7. Real Exchange Rate, Rate of Return Differentials, and Portfolio Factors 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 


















     
US DREER    
0.78 0.5  0.76 1.33  0.78  0.05 
   (13.8)***  (2.04)*  (2.6) **  (5.5) ***  (3.1)***  (1.1) 
          
1
US
t NFAY −   0.51 0.23 0.83 0.47 0.9  0.58  -0.01 
  (1.92)* (2.78)**  (5.3)***  (1.1)  (2.75)  ** (1.63)  (.09) 
           
1 _
US
t ST SHARE −   -0.34 0.27  -1.11 -0.45 -0.78  1.43  0.19 
  (.39) (.88) (4.6)***  (.96) (4.7)***  (1.62)  (1.79)* 
           
1 _
US
t FL SHARE −   -0.85 -0.15 -0.02 -0.47 0.03  -0.7  0.13 
  (1.82)* (.94)  (1.52)  (.94)  (2.35)**  (1.4)  (1.3) 
           
Adjusted R
2  0.24  0.8  0.55 0.16 0.54 0.27 -0.02 
          
Observations  22  18 18 23 23 23 23 
          
DW  1.55  2.33 1.71 1.81 1.79  2.5  1.79 
 
Note:  In Column (1) the dependent variable is the percentage change in the U.S. real 
effective exchange rate. In Columns (2)-(4), the dependent variable is the difference between 
the rate of return on assets held in the U.S. by foreign investors and the rate of return on other 
cross-border assets held by foreign investors. In Column (5) ((6)) the dependent variable is 
the difference between equity (debt) returns in the U.S. and in the rest of the world. In 
Column (7) the dependent variable is the difference between the growth rate in the U.S. and 
the rest of the world. RHS variables are defined as follows: 
US DREER is the rate of U.S. real 
appreciation vis-à-vis its trading partners, 
US NFAY  is the ratio of U.S. net foreign assets to 
GDP, _
US ST SHARE is the share of the U.S. in the rest of the world’s total cross-border 
holdings in the asset category being considered, and _
US FL SHARE  is the share of capital 
flows to the U.S. in the rest of the world’s total cross-border capital flows in the asset 
category being considered. Estimation by OLS, with t-statistics calculated using Newey-West 
standard errors. The regression in column (1) also includes an AR(1) correction.  ***,**,* 









Table 8. Capital Flows and Portfolio Factors 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
































    
Lagged Dep. Var.   0.54  0.61  0.24 0.3 -0.83  -0.53  0.58  0.36 
  (3.0)*** (3.0)  ***  (1.53)  (1.45) (5.26)*** (2.11)*  (4.4)***  (1.99)* 
       
Lagged returns  -0.06 -0.02 -1.44 0.09 0.16 0.11 0.17 -0.06 
  (.32)  (.4)  (3.56)*** (.34) (4.93)*** (.09) (2.77)**  (.6) 
       
1
US
t L −   0.11  -0.09  1.14  -0.19  
 (1.11)   (.8)    (5.75)***    (2.42)**   
       
1 _
US








   (.61)    (.63)    (3.4)***    (1.82)* 
       
Adjusted R
2  0.33 0.52 0.37 -0.14 0.67  0.2  0.55 0.33 
       
Observations  18 21 15 15 15 15 21 21 
       
DW  1.62 1.64 1.92  1.3  1.87 1.93  1.9  1.99 
 
Note:  Estimation by OLS, with t-statistics calculated using Newey-West standard errors. In 
columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) the dependent variable is capital flows to the U.S. in the 
respective category, scaled by outstanding U.S. liabilities. In the remaining columns, the 
dependent variable is the difference between capital flows to the U.S. and capital flows to 
other destinations, scaled by the respective size of outstanding liabilities. As for RHS 
variables, lagged returns are returns on U.S. external liabilities for columns (1), (3), (5), and 
(7), and the return differential between the U.S. and the ROW for columns (2), (4), (6), (8). 
1 t L −  is the outstanding stock of U.S. external liabilities in the category being considered, 
scaled by GDP, and  _
US ST SHARE is the share of the U.S. in the rest of the world’s total 
cross-border holdings in the asset category being considered. ***,**,* denote significance at 























Note: the emerging Asia group includes China, Hong Kong SAR, Taiwan prov. of China, 
Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. The Swi + Nordics group includes Norway, 
Sweden, and Switzerland. The Middle East group includes Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, 

























Note: the emerging Asia group includes China, Hong Kong SAR, Taiwan prov. of China, 
Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. The Swi + Nordics group includes Norway, 
Sweden, and Switzerland. The Middle East group includes Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, 


















NFA/world GDP (right scale)
 
Note: the dashed line plots the standard deviation in the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP 
and the solid line the standard deviation in the ratio of net foreign assets to domestic GDP for 
a large set of industrial countries and emerging markets. The samples excludes transition 
economies 9for which data are available only since the early 1990s) and extreme outliers 




























unweighted average (left scale)
 


























capital gain (ratio of GDP) RER  
 





















Capital gains (ratio of GDP) Real exchange rate  
Note: capital gains are the difference between the net foreign asset position and cumulative 















1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Total liabilities
Portfolio equity + FDI liabilities
Debt liabilities
Note: Total liabilities are U.S. gross external liabilities scaled by total foreign assets of the 
rest of the world; portfolio equity + FDI liabilities are the sum of gross U.S. FDI and 
portfolio equity liabilities, scaled by the portfolio equity and FDI assets of the rest of the 
world; and debt liabilities are gross U.S. portfolio debt and other liabilities, scaled by total 






 Figure 8. United States: net external position, underlying components (ratio of GDP) 
 
Net other claims 
Net portfolio debt











1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004  
 
Note: net portfolio equity + FDI equals the difference between the sum of FDI and portfolio 
equity assets and the sum of FDI and portfolio equity liabilities. Net other indicates the 
difference between the stock of other assets and other liabilities, and net portfolio debt the 







Figure 9. Composition of capital flows to the United States, 1980-2004 
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Note: Equity inflows to the United States (portfolio and FDI) are scaled by the outstanding 
stock of U.S. equity liabilities; debt inflows (portfolio and other) are scaled by outstanding 






Figure 10. United States: Composition of Capital Inflows (ratio of GDP) 
 




















Figure 11. Capital flows to the United States (percent of rest of the world’s capital outflows) 
Debt







1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002  
Note: The solid line (“Debt”) is the three-year moving average of debt flows to the United 
States as a share of total debt outflows of the rest of the world. The broken line (“Portfolio 
equity+FDI”) is the three-year moving average of the sum of portfolio equity and FDI 
inflows to the United States, as a share of portfolio equity + FDI outflows of the rest of the 
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Note: Ratio of official reserves in percent of total foreign liabilities for the group of non-
industrial countries. Institute for International Integration Studies
The Sutherland Centre, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland